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ON THE RELATION BETWEEN THE RULE OF 
LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION 
John V. Orth* 
THE RULE OF LAW: ALBERT VENN DICEY, VICTORIAN JURIST. 
By Richard A. Cosgrove. Chapel Hill: The University of North Car-
olina Press. 1980. Pp. xv, 319. $19.50. 
The rule of law does not apply in modern 
Britain which, despite the forms and some 
appearances of liberal democracy, when a 
Labour government is in power, is a dictator-
ship headed by a group of trade union lead-
ers and their political servants. 1 
Blatant editorializing is not unknown in books that purport to be 
scholarly and scientific, even in reference books- Samuel Johnson, 
for example, enlivened his great Dictionary with idiosyncratic defini-
tions2 - but the political diatribe used as an epigraph above seems 
out of place in the article "rule oflaw" in the new Oxford Companion 
to Law.3 And yet, the phrase has carried a half-concealed political 
comment from the time that it was given currency, if not coined, by 
the Victorian jurist Albert Venn Dicey.4 
Before the appearance of Professor Cosgrove's life of Dicey, 
there was no full-scale biography. At the request of Dicey's widow, 
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. A.B. 
1969, Oberlin College; J.D. 1974, M.A. 1975, Ph.D. 1977, Harvard University. - Ed. 
1. D. WALKER, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 1094 (1980). 
2. He defined "lexicographer" as a "writer of dictionaries; a harmless drudge ... ," and 
"excise" as a "hateful tax levied upon co=odities, and adjudged not by the common judges 
of property, but by wretches hired by those to whom excise is paid." See 2 S. JOHNSON, D1c-
TIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, s.v. "lexicographer" (1755); 1 id., s.v. "excise." The 
Commissioners of Excise consulted the Attorney General about whether Johnson could be 
prosecuted for libel for the latter definition; they were reportedly told that he could be, but 
were advised for prudential reasons not to prosecute. See l J. BoswELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL 
JOHNSON 295 n.9 (G. Hill & L. Powell eds. 1934-64). 
3. For further polemics in The Oxford Companion to Law, see the articles on "social serv-
ices" ("the sacred cows of modern Britain which constantly grow fatter and more expensive to 
keep, which it is deemed sacrilege even to touch, and which can never be killed oft") and 
"trade unions" ("They represent the gravest threat to democracy, liberty, and economic pro-
gress and prosperity yet known and constantly call for the law to be kept out of industrial 
relations to enable anarchy to be promoted."). See D. WALKER, supra note 1, at 1152, 1229-30. 
The ''vigorous personal views" of the author have been noted elsewhere. See Odgers, Book 
Review, 97 LAW Q. REV. 143, 145 (1981). 
4. Cosgrove makes clear that although the phrase is sometimes attributed to Dicey, it was 
only popularized by him. P. 87 n.70. As Dicey admitted, he owed much of the concept to 
W.E. Hearn. See Arndt, The Origins of J)icey"s Concept of the "Rule of Law," 31 AUSTL. L.J. 
117, 123 (1957). 
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Robert ~- Rait had edited the Memorials of Albert Venn .Dicey5 
within a few years of his death. While containing much valuable 
information, the Memorials have a crepe-decked Victorian air; at 
times, they bring irreverently to mind J.P. Marquand's satiric novel 
The Late George Apley. Rait conscientiously includes, for example, 
the recollection of a former maid of the Diceys: "She had settled 
him in the garden with his books. Presently he came hurrying in 
quite cross: 'Why didn't you come and remind me it was raining? 
My books have all got wet.' "6 Other authors, too, have contributed 
to the image of Dicey as an ineffectual, absent-minded professor. In 
his history of the Oxford Law School, F.H. Lawson repeats the story 
that when Dicey was at Harvard to deliver his famous lectures on 
Law and Public Opinion, "a boy had to be sent to him every morning 
to take him to the place where he was to lecture."7 For a more seri-
ous assessment of Dicey, one had to tum to H.G. Hanbury's history 
of the Vinerian Chair of Common Law at Oxford,8 which Dicey oc-
cupied from 1882 to 1909. There is no fooling in Hanbury's portrait: 
Dicey is a thinker first and foremost, "one who was to prove himself 
worthy to claim parity with Blackstone himself."9 It is an intellec-
tual portrait solely, and the colors and highlights are bright and com-
plimentary: "There are hardly enough words in our own, or any 
other, language to do him sufficient honour." 10 Rait had made "no 
attempt at an appraisal of the man through his writings." Dicey's 
biography, wrote Hanbury in 1958, "remains to be written." 11 
Professor Cosgrove has remedied that deficiency. The great 
value of his work is that it permits us to see for the first time that the 
admixture of law and politics in so many of Dicey's works was not 
an intellectual accident or oversight. Dicey's life was all of a piece; 
as a lawyer and legal scholar, he was a politician manque. Cosgrove 
thus stands the received image of Dicey on its head: instead of a 
5. MEMORIALS OF ALBERT VENN DICEY (R. Rait ed. 1925). 
6. Id. at 291. 
7. F. LAWSON, THE OXFORD LAW SCHOOL, 1850-1965, at 70 (1968). Lawson sought to 
palliate Dicey's deficiencies by observing that "the plan of the Harvard Yard is rather confus-
ing, at least to an absent-minded Professor." Id. Citations to Dicey's Lectures on 11/e Re/a/ion 
Between Law and Public Opinion in England IJuring the Nineteenth Century (1905) are hereinaf-
ter shortened to "LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION." 
8. H. HANBURY, THE VINERIAN CHAIR AND LEGAL EDUCATION (1958). 
9. Id. at 97. See W. HOLDSWORTH, THE HISTORIANS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 92 
(1928) ("Dicey will hold, in the history of the legal literature of the nineteenth century, a place 
not unlike that which Blackstone holds in the legal literature of the eighteenth century; for 
both have written books which became classics whilst they were still alive."). 
10. H. HANBURY, supra note 8, at 102. 
11. Id. at 102-03. 
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great intellect with an odd penchant for political controversy, Cos-
grove reveals a passionate but unsuccessful politician who produced 
influential legal books from time to time. Dicey's most enduring le-
gal work, Conflict of Laws, was that farthest removed from politics. 
Law and Public Opinion, once equally well-regarded, is now revealed 
as a disguised political pamphlet, albeit an influential one. 
Dicey's life before his appointment, in middle age, to the Viner-
ian Chair helps to explain his strange dual career as a legal scholar 
and political pamphleteer. Dicey was born in 1835, three years after 
the first Reform Act 12 had enfranchised the middle class and also 
three years after the death of Jeremy Bentham, whose ideas, as Di-
cey understood them, were to guide him throughout his life. Dicey's 
parents, as Cosgrove points out, were members of the "intellectual 
aristocracy" (p. 4): his father's family were hereditary editors of a 
regional newspaper, the Northampton Mercury; his mother's family, 
the Stephens, were prominent Evangelicals who had produced a dis-
tinguished line of judges and writers. 13 The Diceys, in other words, 
were of the class that benefitted most from the first Reform Act, and 
young Albert Dicey imbibed the values of his parents' age and class: 
earnestness, articulateness, hard work, and self-reliance. The paren-
tal influence had extra opportunity to work because an obscure mus-
cular ailment kept Dicey at home until, at seventeen, he went to 
King's College School in London and then two years later to Balliol 
College, Oxford. After leaving Oxford, Dicey read law at the Inner 
Temple and was called to the bar in 1863. Despite his physical 
handicap, Dicey had great expectations that his inbred ambition to 
serve the nation would be fulfilled. 
Dicey's career was barely begun, however, before the nation he 
aspired to serve was transformed. The English constitution that 
Walter Bagehot had so artfully described was passing away even 
before his book of that name was published;14 the mid-Victorian 
"age of equipoise" 15 was terminated by the second Reform Act in 
1867,16 which enfranchised a large part of the working class. Dicey 
12. 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 45 (1832). 
13. Albert Dicey's grandfather, James Stephen, was a master in Chancery. His uncle, 
Henry John Stephen, was a serjeant-at-law and the author of a Summary of the Criminal Law 
(1834) and of New Commentaries on the Law of England (1841). His cousin, Sir James 
Fitzjames Stephen, became a judge and wrote a History of the Criminal Law (1883). Another 
cousin, Sir Leslie Stephen, was a formidable Victorian intellectual; the latter's daughter was 
Virginia Woolf. 
14. See w. BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION (London 1867). 
15. See W. BURN, THE AGE OF EQUIPOISE (1964) (covering 1852 to 1867). 
16. 30 & 31 Viet., c. 102 (1867). Compare R. HARRISON, BEFORE THE SOCIALISTS (1965) 
with M. COWLING, 1867: DISRAELI, GLADSTONE AND REVOLUTION (1967). 
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was unable to find his place in the new political world. After years 
of unceasing labor, he was forced to the bitter admission that his 
ambition was to be denied: "By 1880 he had reached middle age 
without the success at the bar he had envisioned; his journalistic en-
deavors had not yet made any appreciable mark on public opinion; 
and his government career was bogged down in minor legal work" 
(p. 43). Like his near contemporary Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Di-
cey may have felt that if a man was to make his mark in life, he must 
do it before he was forty. I7 But while Holmes met the deadline, pub-
lishing The Common Law five days before his fortieth birthday, Di-
cey missed it: In his mid-thirties he published the competent, but 
uninspired Treatise on the Rules for the Selection of the Parties to an 
Action (1870), and in his mid-forties he produced the more success-
ful, but no less esoteric Law of .Domicil as a Branch of the Law of 
England (1879). In 1882, he was offered the Vinerian Chair at Ox-
ford, an academic appointment that Blackstone had held first, but 
that had fallen to undistinguished appointees throughout the nine-
teenth century. The hope was that the next tenant would restore the 
tarnished luster of the chair. Forsaking his youthful ambitions of 
political office, Dicey took up the academic challenge. 
The first fruits of Dicey's professorship, his lectures on The Law 
of the Constitution, were published in 1885. The principal elements 
of his jurisprudential and political philosophy were already firmly 
established. ''Two features have at all times since the Norman Con-
quest characterised the political institutions of England," 18 he confi-
dently declared. The first of these venerable features is the 
supremacy of the central government, since 1688 the supremacy, spe-
cifically, of Parliament. The second feature, "closely connected with 
the first," is the rule oflaw. I9 As Dicey defined it, the rule oflaw has 
three meanings in England: (1) that no one can be made to suffer 
punishment or to pay damages for any conduct not definitely forbid-
den by law; (2) that everyone's legal rights and liabilities are deter-
mined by the ordinary courts of the realm (j.e., that England has no 
equivalent of the French droit administrat!f, distinct laws and courts 
for government officials); and (3) that everyone's individual rights 
are derived from the ordinary law of the land, not from a written 
constitution, with the result that the English constitution is the prod-
uct of the ordinary functioning of the courts and not the source of 
17. See 2 M. HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 8, 135 (1963). 
18. A. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 179 (7th 
ed. 1908). 
19. Id 
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the courts' jurisdiction.20 
In succinctly summarizing Dicey's argument, Cosgrove both fo-
cuses on this key concept of the rule of law and conscientiously re-
views the cogent criticisms that have been leveled at Dicey's ill-
informed, but nonetheless influential opposition to droit administra-
tif. These criticisms had begun in Dicey's lifetime and induced him 
to qualify his original view in later editions of his influential book. 
Cosgrove's research in Dicey's private correspondence discloses, 
however, how obstinately Dicey clung to the second article in his 
definition of the rule of law - that the ordinary courts should deter-
mine all questions of rights and liabilities. "In his public writings 
Dicey grudgingly acknowledged the merits of droit administrat!f; pri-
vately he still maintained that no other legal system matched that of 
England" (p. 102). As Cosgrove demonstrates, Dicey's claim to be a 
"political expert" was hollow indeed. It therefore seems odd to me 
that The Law of the Constitution escapes Cosgrove's political analy-
sis. Perhaps it does so because it was composed before the most bla-
tant phase ofDicey's politicking opened in late 1885. But Dicey was 
no less a politician out of his metier when he wrote The Law of the 
Constitution than when he wrote his later volumes on Home Rule. 
In any event, constitutional law is inevitably the continuation of 
politics by other means. Dicey may have been arming the constitu-
tional lawyers for the struggle that each year brought closer. 
Dicey soon began to exhaust his energies writing political works 
for the popular press. No sooner had The Law of the Constitution 
been published than the news was leaked that William E. Gladstone, 
the Grand Old Man of the Liberal Party, had been converted to the 
view that Home Rule should be conceded to Ireland.21 Despite his 
lifelong commitment to Liberalism, Dicey was a diehard Unionist, 
opposed to any weakening of the tie that bound England and Ire-
land. Along with a considerable portion of the Liberal Party, Dicey 
broke with Gladstone and entered into a uneasy alliance with the 
Tories, an alliance that eventually produced the modem Conserva-
tive Party.22 For the rest of his life Dicey used his name and talents 
in the battle against Home Rule; he wrote half a dozen books23 and a 
20. Id at 198-99. 
21. See 3 J. MORLEY, THE LIFE OF WILLIAM EWART GLADSTONE 264-65 (1903). 
22. See R. BLAKE, THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY FROM PEEL TO CHURCHILL 162 (1970); 
Cornford, Tlte Transformation of Conservatism in the Late Nineteenth Century, 7 VICT. STUD. 
35 (1963). 
23. See ENGLAND'S CASE AGAINST HOME RULE (1886); WHY ENGLAND MAINTAINS THE 
UNION (1887); LETTERS ON UNIONIST DELUSIONS (1887); THE VERDICT: A TRACT ON THE 
POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REPORT OF THE PARNELL COMMISSION (1890); A LEAP IN 
758 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 80:753 
dozen articles24 for the cause. From Irish policy, Dicey's antipathy 
to the Liberal Party spread to other issues. Abandoning his earlier 
misgivings, he promoted the referendum as a check on parliamen-
tary power,25 but only because he was convinced that Home Rule 
would be perennially unpopular with the electorate. He criticized 
the social legislation of the Liberal government,26 especially the Old 
Age Pensions Act of 190827 and the National Insurance Act of 
1911.28 He also denounced the Trade Disputes Act of 1906.29 Re-
versing his earlier commitment to the enfranchisement of women, he 
worked against what was to become, in effect, the fourth Reform 
Act.3° Cosgrove's study of Dicey's political evolution has added a 
valuable case study to the political history of late Victorian and Ed-
wardian Britain, and has placed Dicey's later legal scholarship in a 
new light. 
During these years of constant political publication, Dicey also 
produced two of his most celebrated legal works. In 1896, he pub-
lished A .Digest of the Law of England with Reference to the Conflict of 
Laws. Unlike American conflicts scholarship, which primarily con-
cerns myriad and troublesome problems of jurisdiction among the 
states, the study of the conflict of laws in England is a branch of 
private international law - largely a matter of the enforceability of 
THE DARK: A CRITICISM OF THE PRINCIPLES OF HOME RULE AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE BILL 
OF 1893 (1893); A FOOL'S PARADISE (1913). 
24. See Ireland and Victoria, 49 CONTEMP. REV. 169 (1886); The JJuties of Unionists, in 
THE CASE FOR THE UNION: A COLLECTION OF SPEECHES, PAMPHLETS, AND LEAFLETS ON 
HOME RULE FOR IRELAND (3d ser. 1887); The JJefense of the Union, 61 CONTEMP. REV. 314 
(1892); The Protest of Irish Protestantism, 62 CONTEMP. REV. l (1892); The Unionist Outlook, 
in 3 PUBLICATIONS OF THE IRISH UNIONIST ALLIANCE 463 (1894); Unionists and the House of 
Lords, 24 NATL. REV. 690 (1895); The JJue Representation of England, 38 NATL. REV. 359 
(1901); To Unionists and Imperialists, 84 CONTEMP. REV. 305 (1903); Can Unionists Support a 
Home Rule Government?, 89 CONTEMP. REV. 247 (1906); Facts and Thoughts far Unionists, 75 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER 717 (1914); The Appeal lo the Nation, 75 THE NINE· 
TEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER 945 (1914); Is It Wise lo Establish Home Rule Before the End of 
the War?, 82 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER 1 (1917); Ireland as a "JJominion," 82 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER 700 (1917). 
25. Compare The Referendum, 23 NATL. REV. 65 (1894) and The Referendum and Its Cril• 
ics, 212 Q. REV. 538 (1910) with R. RA1T, supra note 5, at 122. The referendum did not in fact 
become a recognized part of English constitutional law until 1975 when it was used to author-
ize British accession to the European Economic Community. See Referendum Act, 1975, c. 
33. 
26. See LA w AND PUBLIC OPINION, at xxxv-xxxix, quoted in M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIED· 
MAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 98-99 (1979). 
27. 8 Edw. 7, c. 40. 
28. 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 55. 
29. See text at notes 44-46 infra. 
30. See The Representation of the People Act, 1918, 7 & 8 Geo. 5, c. 64 (enfranchising 
women over 30). For Dicey's explanation of his volte-face on this issue, linking it with his 
opposition to Home Rule, see LETTERS TO A FRIEND ON VOTES FOR WOMEN 3-4 (1908), 
quoted at p. 217. 
March 1982] The Rule of Law and Public Opinion 759 
foreign contracts and the validity of foreign marriages. Within this 
narrow field Dicey made his greatest mark. His talent for extracting 
principles from cases and then arranging them systematically was 
well-suited to the subject matter. Among lawyers the book was an 
immediate success. Cosgrove describes it as Dicey's "foremost con-
tribution," the book "on which his reputation as a legal scholar 
rests" (p. 163). But however venerated in legal circles, Co'!flict of 
Laws understandably did not catch the public eye. Law and Public 
Opinion did. 
When, at the close of the nineteenth century, Dicey ventured into 
legal history, he located the motive power of legal change in public 
opinion. In his Lectures on the Relation Between Law and Public 
Opinion in England During the Nineteenth Century, delivered at 
Harvard in 1898 and published in 1905, Dicey essayed a legal history 
of his own century. The undertaking was ambitious in scope: to 
place legal developments in the context of social evolution during an 
eventful hundred years. About the time he began working on Law 
and Public Opinion, a constellation of brilliant scholars was examin-
ing the intellectual underpinnings of the great achievements of the 
nineteenth century. Edwin Cannan dissected classical economic the-
ory;31 Graham Wallas studied the psychological facfors in politics;32 
Elie Halevy and Leslie Stephen (Dicey's cousin) investigated utilita-
rianism. 33 Like his contemporaries, Dicey looked to ideas for the 
secret of change in his discipline. Unlike them, he imposed a frame 
of reference on his discipline that has endured into the late twentieth 
century. While explanations of historical change in terms of chang-
ing ideas have been displaced by newer theories, the intellectual his-
tory that Dicey talked about at the end of the nineteenth century 
continues to shape English legal historiography.34 
31. See E. CANNAN, A HISTORY OF THE THEORIES OF PRODUCTION & DISTRIBUTION IN 
ENGLISH POLITICAL ECONOMY FROM 1776 TO 1848 (1898); A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE 
NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (E. Cannan ed. 1904) (the standard 
edition). 
32. See G. WALLAS, HUMAN NATURE IN POLITICS (1909); G. WALLAS, THE LIFE OF 
FRANCIS PLACE 1771-1854 (1898). 
33. E. HALEVY, LA FORMATION DU RADICALISME PHILOSOPHIQUE (1904); E. HALEVY, 
THOMAS HODGSKIN (1903); L. STEPHEN, THE ENGLISH UTILITARIANS (1900). 
34. See, e.g., A. HARDING, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 333-39 (1966); 13 W. 
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 41-155 (1952); LAW AND OPINION IN ENGLAND 
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (M. Ginsberg ed. 1959); A. MANCHESTER, A MODERN LEGAL 
HISTORY OF ENGLAND AND WALES, 1750-1950, at 13-1:i, 224-25, 242-44, 333-34, 408-10 
(1980); R. STEVENS, LAW AND POLITICS (1978) (reviewed by Orth, 54 TUL. L. REV. 798 
(1980)); Finer, The Transmission of Benthamite Ideas, 1820-50, in STUDIES IN THE GROWTH OF 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY GOVERNMENT 11 (G. Sutherland ed. 1972). Echoes of the Diceyan 
interpretation may even be detected in America. Compare LA w AND PUBLIC OPINION 64 
(Benthamism "has swept away restraints on individual energy") with J. HURST, LAW AND THE 
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In examining his own century, Dicey perceived "three periods, 
during each of which a different current or stream of opinion was 
predominant, and in the main governed the development of the law 
of England."35 These great periods were, first, the period of "Black-
stonian complacency and old Toryism," ending about 1825; second, 
the period of "Benthamism or individualism," ending about 1870; 
and third, the period of collectivism, which still dominated England 
when Dicey made his final reflections on the subject in 1914.36 Di-
cey's scheme was not wholly original. Just as Dicey borrowed the 
concept of the rule of law from Hearn, so also he borrowed from 
another the idea of the crucial importance of Benthamism. Al-
though Cosgrove rightly stresses the former, he unaccountably over-
looks the latter debt. In 1875, Roland K. Wilson published a short 
volume on The History of Modern English Law.37 Finding no gen-
eral study of the subject since Blackstone's Commentaries a century 
earlier, Wilson sensibly began his work with a sketch of "English law 
in the time of Blackstone."38 He then searched for a convenient way 
of organizing later developments. Perhaps taking a cue from Henry 
Maine,39 Wilson attributed "legal changes since 1825"40 to the influ-
ence of Jeremy Bentham. Dicey seems to have followed Wilson's 
lead:41 Dicey's first two great periods were dominated by Blackstone 
and Bentham; the delay in shifting from one to another was attrib-
uted to "old Toryism." Dicey's only original contribution to the tri-
partite scheme he made famous was his discovery of collectivism. At 
first, he was uncertain when to date the dawn of this new age. At 
Harvard he apparently described the little-known Molestation of 
Workmen Act of 185942 as the morning star of collectivism; however, 
when he prepared Law and Public Opinion for the press, he moved 
CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 7 (1956) ("the re-
lease of individual creative energy was the dominant value") and L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY 
OF AMERICAN LAW 157 (1973) ("the first half of the [nineteenth] century was a period of ••• 
the release of creative energy"). 
35. A. DICEY, LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENO• 
LAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 62 (2d ed. 1914). 
36. Id at Introduction to the Second Edition passim. 
37. R. WILSON, THE HISTORY OF MODERN ENGLISH LAW (1875). 
38. Id at 1-132. 
39. See H. MAINE, LECTURES ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS 397 (1875) ("I do 
not know a single law-reform effected since Bentham's day which cannot be traced to his 
influence,'' used as an epigraph by Wilson). Cf. BENTHAMIANA: SELECT EXTRACTS FROM THE 
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 350-51 (J. Burton ed. 1843) (list of reforms attributed to 
Bentham). 
40. R. WILSON, supra note 37, at 171-276. 
41. See LAW AND Puauc OPINION, supra note 7, at ix. 
42. 22 Viet., c. 34. 
March 1982] The Rule of Law and Public Opinion 761 
the date to around 1870.43 This background, of course, only rein-
forces Cosgrove's assessment of the book not as a pure history, but 
rather as a picture of "the Victorian world as Dicey remembered it, 
indeed as he hoped it had been, because that portrait was crucial to 
his 1905 politics" (p. 192). 
Dicey did not sympathize with the public opinion that he denom-
inated collectivist. By the time he wrote The Law of the Constitution, 
the Reform Acts had put the power of Parliament in hands that he 
could not trust. In particular, he disliked the Trade Disputes Act of 
1906,44 which exempted trade unions from liability in tort. Like the 
author of the article in the current Oxford Companion to Law, he 
deplored what he saw as the politicians' subservience to the public 
opinion favoring the trade unions: "An enactment which frees trade 
unions from the rule of equal law stimulates among workmen the 
fatal delusion that workmen should aim at the attainment, not of 
equality, but of privilege."45 Implicitly, Dicey was adding to his ear-
lier definition of the rule of law the notion of uniformity, ie., that 
everyone's legal rights and liabilities ought to be the same.46 Mea-
sured after the fact by this standard, the Trade Disputes Act of 1906 
was found wanting, just as, for reasons that also go unexpressed, 47 
the modem Labor Party is found wanting. The rule of law, it seems, 
is a counter in the political game as well as a chapter heading in 
constitutional law. 
Although the phrase "the rule of law" is used in America, where 
it is the equivalent of "due process of law,"48 its primary role is in 
the English context. The rule of law is meant to impose a limit on 
43. See Orth, English Law and Striking Workmen: The Molestation of Workmen Act, 1859, 
2 J. LEGAL HIST. 238, 253 (1981). 
44. 6 Edw. 7, c. 47. 
45. LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION at xlvii (emphasis added). See also 2 w. HOLDSWORTH, A 
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 446 (1923) ("It is not till these last days that Parliament itself has 
allowed exemptions from the rule of law in favour of the supposed indefeasible rights of turbu-
lent Trades Unions, conscientious churchmen, and conscientious objectors, to the great detri-
ment of the peace and stability of the state.") (emphasis added). 
46. I cannot accept Cosgrove's assertion that Dicey viewed the Trade Disputes Act of 1906 
as a violation of "the rule of law as he had popularized it." P. 207 (emphasis added). Later, 
also in the heat of political passion, Dicey enlarged the concept still more. In 1909 he called on 
Unionists to "pledge themselves to restore the rule of law in Ireland," quoted at p. 232, by 
which he meant simply that they should promise to reestablish law and order in that troubled 
island. 
47. Although the author of The Oxford Companion to Law repeats Dicey's definition of the 
rule of law, he is content himself to describe it as "a concept of the utmost importance but 
having no defined, nor readily definable, content." D. WALKER, supra note 1, at 1093. 
48. See G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 105-07 (1977); Symposium, Post-War 
Thinking About the Rule of Law, 59 MICH. L. REV. 485 (1961); Jones, The Rule of Law and the 
Welfare State, 58 CoLUM. L. REV. 143, 145-56 (1958). 
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the power of Parliament, or at least to provide a standard by which 
the exercise of parliamentary power may be evaluated. The problem 
is peculiarly English. When, in the early seventeenth century, the 
Stuart monarchs made a bid for absolute power based on the French 
model, their opponents searched for some counterbalancing English 
institution. Not unnaturally, the great lawyer Sir Edward Coke 
sought to locate the limits on royal power in the common law, that is, 
as a practical matter, in the courts. Despite the facts that law is nor-
mally an instrument of government power, not of restraint, and that 
English judges are political appointees, Coke sought to use certain 
powerful medieval concepts, such as natural law and customary 
right, to limit the sovereign; he counted on a cadre of resolute and 
well-connected judges, led by himself, to stand up to the king. As 
things turned out, of course, the courts were frail reeds. The only 
institution that was a match for the crown was Parliament. It finally 
proved itself superior both on the bloody battlefields of the English 
Civil War and in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. In the middle of 
the eighteenth century Blackstone, Dicey's predecessor in the Viner-
ian Chair, made it plain that he understood the significance of the 
victory. One Parliament could do anything, except bind a later 
Parliament.49 
49. See l w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 90 (1765). 
As a token of his recognition that the medieval verities were gone, Blackstone took up a 
hoary problem of English constitutional theory - whether a man can be a judge in his own 
case. The issue is, in fact, not whether a man can decide his own case, but whether such a 
decision-maker can appropriately be labeled a 'judge," in the legal sense of that word. Medie-
val thinking on the subject was summed up in the seventeenth century by Lord Coke: 
[I]fany Act of Parliament gives to any to hold, or to have conusans [sic] of all manner of 
pleas arising before him within his manor of D., yet he shall hold no plea, to which he 
himself is a part; for, as hath been said, iniquum est aliquem suae rei esse judicem [it is 
wrong for a man to be a judge in his own case]. 
Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 118b, 77 Eng. Rep. 638, 654 (1610). See Thorne, J)r. 
Bonham's Cose, 54 LAW Q. REV. 543 (1938). In the eighteenth century, Blackstone agreed that 
it was "unreasonable that any man should determine his own quarrel," 1 W. BLACKSTONE, 
supra, at 91 (footnote omitted), and therefore advised contemporary judges to construe a gen-
eral grant (such as that supposed by Coke) to exclude that result; but he fully recognized the 
logic of parliamentary supremacy: 
[I]fwe could conceive it possible for the parliament to enact, that he should try as well his 
own causes as those of other persons, there is no court that has "power to defeat the intent 
of the legislature, when couched in such evident and express words, as leave no doubt 
whether it was the intent of the legislature or no. 
Id. See J. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 189-91 
(1955). Blackstone could, however, afford to be logical. The aristocrats who ruled England 
from 1688 to 1832 were unlikely to do anything that would outrage him. His trust, in other 
words, was in men, not laws. Blackstone's American contemporaries had, of course, more 
reason to fear the class in power. The Constitution of 1787 was meant to prevent the powerful 
from disregarding the principles dear to the Founding Fathers. On the question of whether a 
man can be a judge in his own case, for example, the Supreme Court has found a negative 
answer in the Constitution. Cf. Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977) (justice of the peace 
paid a fee if he issued a search warrant but nothing if he denied the application); Ward v. 
Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) (mayor responsible for village finances and mayor's 
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In terms reminiscent of Coke's, Dicey sought to limit Parlia-
ment's power. Ironically, his arguments have appealed to more than 
the turncoat Liberals in Edwardian England; they have even earned 
praise from a modem Marxist historian. In his recent study of the 
Black Act,50 the most sanguinary part of'England's bloody criminal 
code, E.P. Thompson pledged his allegiance: "The rule of law itself, 
the imposing of effective inhibitions upon power and the defence of 
the citizen from power's all-intrusive claims, seems to me to be an 
unqualified human good."51 Less theoretically, Thompson used the 
concept of the rule of law to explain what for him is a historical 
conundrum: Why did not "the rulers of England," the group in 
which Blackstone put his trust, resort to force to maintain their grasp 
on power? Why, in other words, did Dicey ever have to face the 
unpalatable prospect of power in working-class hands? The answer 
that Thompson has offered is the rule of law. When the Industrial 
Revolution disrupted the "equilibrium of class forces" that main-
tained the aristocracy in power, "the rulers of England were faced 
with alarming alternatives. They could either dispense with the rule 
of law, dismantle their elaborate constitutional structures, counter-
mand their own rhetoric and exercise power by force; or they could 
submit to their own rules and surrender their hegemony."52 Thomp-
son argued that they took "halting steps" in the direction of the first 
alternative, at least insofar as they promulgated, among other repres-
sive legislation, the Combination Acts of 1799 and 1800,53 which 
outlawed trade unions. "But in the end," Thompson conceded, 
"rather than shatter their own self-image and repudiate 150 years of 
constitutional legality, they surrendered to the law."54 The Combi-
nation Laws were repealed in 182455 by the political skills of Francis 
Place.56 Jeremy Bentham and the rule of law had apparently 
coun provided a substantial portion of village funds through fines, forfeitures, costs, and fees); 
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (due process violated where mayor before whom defend-
ant was compelled to stand trial for traffic offenses received fees and costs levied against 
violators). 
50. 9 Geo. 1, c. 22 (1722). 
51. E. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS 266 (1975). Although Thompson may here be 
using "the rule of law'' in a broader sense than that used elsewhere, he would seem to sub-
scribe to the narrower view as well. See E. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORK-
ING CLASS 80, 83 (1964) (John Wilkes could defy the government because "[t]here was no droit 
administrat!f"; "the rule of law was the distinguishing inheritance of the 'free-born 
Englishman' "). 
52. E. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS, supra note 51, at 269. 
53. 39 Geo. 3, c. 81 (1799); 39, 40 Geo. 3, c. 106 (1800). 
54. E. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS, supra note 51, at 269. 
55. 5 Geo. 4, c. 95 (1824). See also 6 Geo. 4, c. 129 (1825). 
56. See G. WALLAS, LIFE OF FRANCIS PLACE, supra note 32, at 197-240. 
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triumphed. 57 
Thompson's excitement about the rule of law has not gone un-
criticized. Morton J. Horwitz, in his review of Thompson's book, 
posed a seditious question: Is the rule of law an unqualified human 
good?58 Horwitz expressed surprise that "a Man of the Left" could 
answer in the affirmative: 
It undoubtedly restrains power, but it also prevents power's benevolent 
exercise. It creates formal equality - a not inconsiderable virtue -
but it promotes substantive inequality by creating a consciousness that 
radically separates law from politics, means from ends, processes from 
outcomes. By promoting procedural justice it enables the shrewd, the 
calculating, and the wealthy to manipulate its forms to their own ad-
vantage. And it ratifies and legitimates an adversarial, competitive, 
and atomistic conception of human relations .... It may be true that 
restraint on power (and simultaneously on its benevolent exercise) is 
about all that we can hope to accomplish in this world. But we should 
never forget that a "legalist" consciousness that excludes "result-ori-
ented" jurisprudence as contrary to the rul~ of law also inevitably dis-
courages the pursuit of substantive justice. 59 
Power, of course, is the key. When the "right people" ruled, Black-
stone had no need for the rule of law. When the working class was 
powerless, Thompson was relieved when the rulers of England sur-
rendered to the law. When the trade unions could work their will in 
Parliament, Dicey was alarmed for the safety of the rule of law, and 
so is the author of The Oxford Companion to Law today. 
51. But see Orth, The British Trade Union Acts of 1824 and 182.5: .Dicey and the Relation 
Between Law and Opinion, 5 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 131 (1976); Orth, The Legal Status of Englis/1 
Trade Unions, 1799-1871, in LAW-MAKING AND LAW-MAKERS IN BRITISH HISTORY 195 (A. 
Harding ed. 1980). 
58. Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualffeed Human Good?, 86 YALE L.J. 561 (1977). 
59. Id at 566. See also Diamond, The Rule of Law Versus the Order of Custom, in THE 
RULE OF LAW 115 (R. Wolff ed. 1971) (imposition of law diminishes ability of custom to 
generate spontaneous order). 
